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CONFESSIONS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003 
 
Michael Stockdale* and Joanne Clough† 
 
Abstract 
The admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales is now governed 
by provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a result of Law Commission reform proposals.  The 
Law Commission’s Report left several issues concerning the admissibility of confessions in the 
context of its proposed hearsay regime unclear, some of which have not yet been clarified by the 
post 2003 Act jurisprudence.  In particular, whilst the authorities have established that confessions 
made by third parties may be admissible in exceptional circumstances, the courts have not yet 
engaged with s.128(2) of the 2003 Act which limits the extent to which confessions made by 
defendants may be admissible under the 2003 Act’s provisions.  Moreover, whilst the Court of 
Appeal has recognised both that certain confessions may exist outside the 2003 Act’s statutory 
framework and that the admissibility of such a confession for the prosecution when made by a 
defendant is governed by s.76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, other issues concerning 





The Law Commission’s report, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics
1
, the 
recommendations in which form the basis of the hearsay regime introduced by Chapter 2 of Part 11 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, does not deal at length with the subject of confessions.  The Law 
Commission largely intended to preserve the rules and provisions that had previously governed the 
admissibility of confessions, only intending to modify the pre-existing regime by making express 
statutory provision concerning admission of a defendant’s confession as evidence for a co-defendant 
and by permitting the admission of confessions made by third parties.  The purpose of this article is 
to consider both the extent to which the Law Commission’s recommendations concerning the 
admissibility of confessions in criminal proceedings under its new hearsay regime have been 
reflected by the approach of the criminal courts in applying the hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act 
and whether there are any  lacunae in the relationship between the provisions of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which govern the admissibility of confessions made by defendants and 
the hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act which the courts have yet to fill.  
 
The Law Commission’s Recommendations  
  The Law Commission proposed that admissions and confessions would fall within one of three 
categories of automatically admissible hearsay evidence
2
, the rationale for the automatic 
admissibility of confessions being: “…the general assumption that what a person says against his or 
her own interests is likely to be true”.
3
  Admissibility would, however, be “subject to the existing 
statutory safeguards.”
4
  Thus, the Law Commission, having initially proposed in its consultation 
paper that,  
“… confessions should continue to be admissible against their makers, subject to section 76 




finally recommended, in line with this original proposal, that: “…the current law be preserved in 
respect of admissions, confessions, mixed statements, and evidence of reaction.”
 6   
    
So far as those circumstances in which a co-defendant wishes to adduce evidence of the defendant’s 
confession are concerned
7
, the Law Commission recommended the enactment of s.76A of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 on the basis that:  
“…the admissibility of a confession by one co-accused at the instance of another should be 
governed by provisions similar to section 76 of PACE, but taking into account the standard of 
proof applicable to a defendant.”
8
   
In relation to the operation of this provision, the Law Commission indicated that: 
 Where a confession is admitted against one accused on behalf of a co-accused, the fact-
finders may consider the admission as exonerating the defendant who did not make it, but 
may not take it as evidence against the defendant who made it.  A hearsay admission is still 
evidence only against the person who made it, and a jury must be warned accordingly. A 




The first sentence of this quotation demonstrates that the Law Commission envisaged that where a 
confession made by a defendant is admitted for a co-defendant under s.76A the confession would 
not be evidence against its maker.  Thus, Durston’s reading of the Law Commission’s proposals was 
that: 
“…the Law Commission was adamant that, where a confession was admitted on behalf of a 
co-accused, but not the Crown, the tribunal of fact should only consider the admission as 
exonerating the co-defendant and not as evidence against its maker.”
10
 
The second and third sentences of the above quotation from the Law Commission’s Report indicate 
that the Law Commission intended to preserve “…the universal rule which excludes out of court 
admissions being used to provide evidence against a co-accused, whether indicted jointly or 
separately…”.
11
  Whilst these sentences appear under the heading “Confessions and co-defendants”, 
they suggest that the Law Commission’s intention was to preserve this rule as a rule that applied to 
confessions in general, whether adduced by a co-defendant or by the Crown.  As is demonstrated 
immediately below, however, it seems that the Law Commission did not intend the operation of this 
rule to preclude the possibility that a confession made by a third party to criminal proceedings could 
be admitted against its maker under the provisions of the 2003 Act.   Thus, whilst the position is not 
clear, it may be that the Law Commission envisaged that confessions admitted under the provisions 
of the 1984 Act would not be admissible against persons other than their makers but intended that 
confessions could potentially be admissible against persons other than their makers under the 
provisions of the 2003 Act.  
So far as confessions made by persons who are not defendants in the proceedings (i.e. confessions 
made by third parties) are concerned, the Law Commission recognised that the existing position was 
that “A confession by someone who is not a defendant in the proceedings is inadmissible hearsay, 
following Blastland…”.
12
  The Law Commission intended, however, that such a confession could be 
admissible under the provision that now exists in the guise of s.116 of the 2003 Act if the witness 
was dead, too ill to attend, could not be found, was outside the U.K. or was in fear or, otherwise 
could be admissible in the interests of justice under the “safety-valve” inclusionary discretion which 
now exists in the form of s.114(1)(d) of the 2003 Act.
13
  The Law Commission’s concerns related to   
“the exclusion of confessions which  are relevant. What should not arise is the situation 
where, because it is known that someone else has confessed, it is feared that a conviction is 
unsafe, but evidence of that confession could not be admitted at the trial.” 
Thus, one of the Law Commission’s examples of the potential admissibility of hearsay evidence 
under its safety-valve inclusionary discretion was as follows:  
“D is charged with assault. X, who is not charged, admits to a friend that he, X, committed 
the assault. D and X are similar in appearance. X’s confession is inadmissible hearsay unless 
the safety-valve is used.”
 14
  
Reliance on a confession made by a third party for such a purpose is not inconsistent with the 
general preservation of the rule that confessions are only admissible against their makers.  The 
following example from the part of Law Commission’s Report relating to hostile witnesses, which 
relates to the provision that now exists as s.119 of the 2003 Act, suggests, however, that the Law 
Commission did intend that a confessions made by a third party could potentially be admitted 
against persons other than its maker under the provisions of the 2003 Act: 
 “…suppose that W has already pleaded guilty and is now a witness for the prosecution. W 
has been deemed hostile and claims that he did not make the confession attributed to him 
in which he implicated D. That confession is admissible against D, as if W were a testifying 
co-accused.”
15
   
Moreover, so far as the admission of hearsay evidence under its safety-valve inclusionary discretion 
is concerned, the Law Commission made clear that its intention was that its proposed safety-valve 
be available both to the prosecution and to the defence.
16
  Nothing in the Law Commission’s Report 
should be taken to suggest that the Law Commission intended to render confessions made by third 
parties routinely admissible against persons other than their makers, however.  Rather, the Law 
Commission envisaged that its proposed “safety-valve” inclusionary discretion “would only be used 
exceptionally”.
17
   
 
The admissibility of confessions made by third parties to criminal 
proceedings under the hearsay provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
Both ss.76 and 76A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which govern the admissibility of 
confessions made by defendants in criminal proceedings, apply to “a confession made by an accused 
person”. Consequently, ss.76 and 76A neither apply to confessions made by persons who have never 
been charged in the proceedings nor to confessions made by persons who have been but are no 
longer charged in the proceedings (for example, because they have pleaded guilty or have been 
convicted).
18
  In other words, ss.76 and 76A do not apply to confessions made by third parties to 
criminal proceedings.  Similarly, s.128(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which limits the extent to 
which confessions may be admissible under the hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act, does not apply 
to confessions made by third parties to criminal proceedings because s.128(2) only applies to “a 
confession made by a defendant”.  
As was seen above, the Law Commission envisaged that confessions made by third parties to 
criminal proceedings could potentially be admissible under hearsay exceptions created by its 
proposed reforms.  In R v Y
19
 the Court of Appeal held that a confession made by a person who had 
previously pleaded guilty to the murder with which the accused was charged and which implicated 
the accused was potentially admissible for the Crown under s.114(1)(d) of the 2003 Act, under which 
the court may admit hearsay evidence if its admission is in the interests of justice.  Their Lordships 
held that s.114(1)(d) is not subordinate to s.114(1)(b).  Rather, their Lordships held that s.114(1)(b) 
(via s.118) preserves certain common law rules of admissibility (including, via s.118(5), rules relating 
to the admissibility of confessions) but does not preserve rules of inadmissibility (such as the 
common law rule that a confession is only admissible against its maker).  In reaching this decision, 
the Court of Appeal
20
 recognised that the Law Commission had envisaged that a confession made by 
a third party could be admitted under its proposed “safety valve”, which now exists in the guise of 
s.114(1)(d).  Thus, their Lordships held that s.114(1)(d) “prevailed over” the common law rule that a 
confession is only admissible against its maker.
21
   
The Court of Appeal in R v Y made clear that whilst confessions made by third parties were 
potentially admissible under s.114(1)(d), “It does not of course follow that hearsay in, or associated 
with, third party confessions should routinely be allowed to be admitted under section 
114(1)(d)...”.
22
  In particular, their Lordships recognised that when the court is reaching a judgment 
as to the admissibility of such evidence under s.114(1)(d) and s.114(2)
23
 (which directs the court to 
consider a variety of specific factors when it is considering the admissibility of hearsay evidence 
under s.114(1)(d)) plus any other relevant factors), two relevant factors will be “the fact that the 
hearsay in question is an accusation against the defendant, rather than an admission against 
interest” and “the fact that it is the Crown which seeks to adduce it”.
24
 In relation to the former 
factor, their Lordships recognised that whilst a person will not normally confess to a crime that the 
person did not commit, a person may well have a motive to make a false allegation against 
another.
25
  As regards the latter factor, their Lordships indicated that: “It does not necessarily follow 
that the interests of justice will point in the same direction upon an application by the Crown as they 
might upon an application made by a defendant”.
26
  Thus, their Lordships indicated that: 
Since the burden of proving the case is upon the Crown and to the high criminal standard, 
very considerable care will need to be taken in any case in which the Crown seeks to rely 
upon an out-of-court statement as supplying it with a case against the defendant when 
otherwise it would have none.   
Fundamentally, their Lordships indicated that: 
the existence of section 114(1)(d) does not make police interviews routinely admissible in 
the case of persons other than the interviewee, and…the reasons why they are ordinarily not 
admissible except in the case of the interviewee are likely to continue to mean that in the 
great majority of cases it will not be in the interests of justice to admit them in the case of 
any other person.
27
   
Thus, whilst s.114(1)(d) prevails over the common law rule that that a confession is only admissible 
against its maker, the reasons why confessions are not normally admissible against persons other 
than their maker continue to be of major significance when the court is considering whether it is in 
the interests of justice to admit a confession as evidence against a person other than its maker.  
With regard to those circumstances in which the third party who made a confession is available to 
testify but is reluctant to do so, the Court of Appeal in R v Y indicated
28
 that: 
…before reaching the conclusion that it is in the interests of justice to admit a hearsay 
statement, the Judge must very carefully consider the alternatives.  The alternatives may 
well include the bringing of an available, but reluctant, witness to court.   
Similarly, in R v Finch
29
 (in which the Court of Appeal held that the judge had properly declined to 
admit in evidence for the accused a confession
30
 made by a former co-defendant who had pleaded 
guilty on the basis that the witness was available to give evidence and it was not in the interests of 
justice to admit his hearsay evidence under s.114(1)(d)) the Court of Appeal indicated that: 
Whatever might be the situation if an erstwhile co-accused were to be unavailable or had 
demonstrably good reason not to give evidence, it will, as it seems to us, often not be in the 
interests of justice for evidence which the giver is not prepared to have tested to be put 
untested before the jury.   
In particular, their Lordships in Finch recognised that if the witness had been called and proved 
adverse to the party calling him, his previous inconsistent statements could have been admitted 
under s.119 of the 2003 Act, under which hearsay evidence of a witness’ previous consistent 
statements may be admissible.  Thus, Finch demonstrates that it will be exceptional for a confession 
made by a third party who is available to testify to be admitted under s.114(1)(d) of the 2003 Act 
and that this will be so even where it is a defendant rather than the prosecution who wishes to 
adduce such evidence.  Finch also demonstrates that (as the Law Commission had envisaged) a 
confession made by a third party may be admissible under provisions of the 2003 Act other than 
s.114(1)(d), such as s.119 or (relying on the reference in Finch to “an erstwhile co-accused” who is 
“unavailable”) s.116.
31
  Equally, in R v Marsh
32
, the Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s decision not 
to admit a confession made by a third party in evidence for the accused, their Lordships recognising 
that had the witness been called there might have been potential to admit his hearsay evidence 
under s.119 of the 2003 Act if his testimony in court had been inconsistent with it.  Finally, R v 
Lamb
33
 demonstrates that in circumstances in which the interests of justice demand the admission 
of a confession made by a former co-defendant as defence evidence for another co-defendant and 
the confession also implicates a third co-defendant the jury should be warned
34
 “that the other 
defendant had not had an opportunity to cross-examine [the witness] and that the evidence lacked 
the force of evidence given by a witness.” 
It is suggested that when the court is considering the admissibility of a confession made by a third 
party under the hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act, the Court should adopt the approach advocated 
by the Court of Appeal in R v Riat
35
 with regard to the making of admissibility decisions under the 
2003 Act’s hearsay provisions. Thus, when determining whether such hearsay evidence is admissible, 
the court should consider: whether the evidence is admissible under a specific statutory gateway 
such as s.116; whether there is material that can be adduced under s.124
36
 to help the  court to test 
or assess the hearsay evidence; whether the specific interests of justice test imposed by s.116(4)
37
 is 
applicable; if no other gateway is applicable, whether the evidence should be admitted in the 
interests of justice under s.114(1)(d); whether the court should exclude the evidence in the exercise 
of its exclusionary discretion
38
; and whether, once the evidence has been admitted, the trial should 
subsequently be stopped under s.125.
39
   There is no reference in Riat to the potential for admitting 
hearsay evidence under s.119 of the 2003 Act, but this is not surprising since the Court of Appeal in 
Riat was concerned with the problems associated with admitting the hearsay evidence of an absent 
witness whereas when hearsay evidence is admitted under s.119 it will be the inconsistent 
statements of a witness who has been called and is, thus, available for cross-examination.  The 
existence of s.119 must, however, be indirectly relevant in the context of the Riat process since, as 
has already been seen, the possibility of calling the third party whose confession implicates the 
accused and, where appropriate, relying upon the confession as evidence of the matters stated 
under s.119 is a matter that may be of relevance when the court is making an admissibility decision 
under s.114(1)(d).   
Examination of the authorities concerning the admissibility of confessions made by third parties 
confirms that the approach of the Court of Appeal in those cases both equates with the Law 
Commission’s intention that confessions made by third parties may potentially be admissible under 
the hearsay exceptions created by the 2003 Act and with the Law Commission’s intention that 
recourse would only be had to its “safety valve” inclusionary discretion in exceptional circumstances.  
A matter than was not considered in any of these cases (because the existence of the concept of the 
“non-hearsay confession” had not yet been recognised by the courts) is whether a non-hearsay 
confession made by a third party is admissible in criminal proceedings as evidence against persons 
other than its maker.  Whether this is so is considered in the final section of this article. 
 
The admissibility of confessions made by defendants under the hearsay 
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
Since it came into force, the admissibility for the prosecution of confessions made by defendants has 
been governed by s.76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, admissibility also being subject 
to the exercise of the court’s exclusionary discretion under s.78 of the 1984 Act and to the exercise 
of the common law exclusionary discretion.
40
  The admissibility of confessions made by defendants 
as evidence for co-defendants is now governed by s.76A of the 1984 Act, which was inserted into the 
1984 Act by s.128(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
As was seen above, the Law Commission intended that under its proposed statutory hearsay regime, 
confessions made by defendants would fall within an “automatic admissibility” category of hearsay 
evidence, admissibility being subject to the operation of ss.76 and 78 of the 1984 Act and the 
exercise of the court’s common law exclusionary discretion or, if the evidence was tendered by a co-
defendant, to the operation of s.76A of the 1984 Act.  Confessions are patently dealt with by two 
provisions of the 2003 Act, namely, s.118 and s.128, but the explanatory notes to the 2003 Act 
specifically deal with confessions in the context of three provisions, namely, s.114, s.118 and s.128.   
Section 114(1) details the four gateways under which hearsay evidence is admissible in criminal 
proceedings.  Section 114(3) provides that: “Nothing in this Chapter affects the exclusion of evidence 
of a statement on grounds other than the fact that it is a statement not made in oral evidence in the 
proceedings.”  The explanatory note to s.114(3)
41
 indicates that: 
“Subsection (3) provides that out of court statements may still be excluded even if they fulfil 
the requirements in this Chapter. For example, confessions must meet the additional 
requirements of sections 76 and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 before 
admission.” 
Section 118(2) abolishes all common law rules that govern the admissibility of hearsay in criminal 
proceedings other than those preserved by s.118(1).  Section 118(1) 5 preserves: “Any rule of law 
relating to the admissibility of confessions or mixed statements in criminal proceedings.”  The 
explanatory notes to s.118(1) 5 indicate
42
 that: “Confessions’ will be admissible as long as they fulfil 
the requirements of sections 76, 76A and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984;…”  
Similarly, the footnote to the Law Commission’s recommendation, which was reproduced above, 
that “…the current law be preserved in respect of admissions, confessions, mixed statements, and 
evidence of reaction”, refers to clause 6(6) of the Law Commission’s draft Bill, which was enacted as 
s.118(1) 5 of the 2003 Act. 
Thus, recourse to the explanatory notes to the 2003 Act and to the Law Commission’s Report 
suggests that the statutory provisions of the 1984 Act which govern the admissibility of confessions 
made by defendants in criminal proceedings are “preserved” by the cumulative operation of s.114(3) 
and s.118(1) 5 of the 2003 Act.  If this is correct then the s.114 gateway under which such evidence is 
admitted must be s.114(1)(b) under which hearsay evidence is admissible in criminal proceedings if 
“any rule of law preserved by section 118 makes it admissible”.  The problem with this analysis is 
that the side note to s.118 refers to “preservation of certain common law categories of admissibility” 
whereas the rules contained in ss.76(1) and 76A(1) of the 1984 Act, under which confessions made 
by defendants are admissible, are clearly statutory in origin.  The s.114 gateway under which 
statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule are preserved is s.114(1)(a), which provides for the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings if “any provision of this Chapter or any 
other statutory provision makes it admissible.”   
It may be that a more logical explanation of the way in which the relevant provisions of the 1984 Act 
dovetail into the 2003 Act’s hearsay regime is that the “automatic admissibility” hearsay exceptions 
created by ss.76(1) and 76A(1) are preserved by s.114(1)(a), that the exclusionary provisions of those 
sections contained in ss.76(2) and 76A(2) are preserved by s.114(3) and that, as Spencer suggested
43
, 
s.118(1) 5 applies in those circumstances in which the admissibility of confessions is still governed by 
the common law.
44
  Conversely, it is possible to support the explanation of s.118(1) 5 in the 
explanatory notes as preserving ss.76(1) and 76A(1) on the basis that whilst the side note refers to 
“common law categories of admissibility”, the words of s.118(1) itself merely refer to the 
preservation of “rules of law”.  Headings  or side notes to sections (like explanatory notes 
themselves) are admissible as aids to construction but are not debated in Parliament and should be 
given less weight than the parts of an Act that are debated in Parliament.
45
   
In practice, provided that it is accepted that the regime in the 1984 Act which regulates the 
admissibility of confessions made by defendants has been preserved by Chapter 2 of the 2003 Act, it 
may be that whether this has been achieved by s.114(1)(a) or by s.114(1)(b) of the 2003 Act is a 
matter which is of little practical significance.  That it was Parliament’s intention to preserve, indeed, 
to enhance, the confession’s regime contained in the 1984 Act is made clear by the existence of 
s.128 of the 2003 Act.  Section 128(1) inserted the new s.76A into the 1984 Act, providing that: 
“Subject to subsection (1), nothing in this Chapter makes a confession by a defendant admissible if it 
would not be admissible under section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984...”  Had 
Parliament not intended to preserve the 1984 Act’s confessions regime the enactment of s.128 
would have been unnecessary.   
Unfortunately, whilst the explanatory notes to s.128 deal with the operation of s.76A they provide 
no assistance in relation to the operation of s.128(2).  Similarly, the Law Commission’s Report 
provides no explanation of how clause 25(2) of its draft Bill, which now exists as s.128(2), is intended 
to operate.  Moreover, the nature and significance of section 128(2), which has been described by 
Hirst as the “the 'forgotten provision' of the 2003 Act”
46
, is yet to be considered by the Supreme 
Court, by the Court of Appeal or by the Divisional Court.   
Spencer
47
 has suggested two possible interpretations of s.128(2).  The narrower interpretation is 
that: 
…section 128(2) merely provides that none of the other hearsay provisions of the CJA 2003 
will allow the Crown to use, as evidence against the person who made it, a confession that 
section 76(2) required to be excluded if there is an attempt to admit it under section 76(1).  
The wider interpretation is that: 
‘The only route by which the extra judicial confessions of accused persons are admissible is 
PACE 1984, section 76.  To that route no bypass is created by any provisions of this Act 
except for the new section 76A of PACE 1984, which now enable them to be used by co-
defendants.  Section 76 allows the Crown to  use  confessions against those who made them 
but not against others, and nothing in any other provisions of the CJS 2003 alters that.’  
Spencer
48
 prefers the narrower interpretation, which he regards as “the most obvious reading of the 
provision” because a consequence of the wider interpretation is that the prosecution could deploy 
one defendant’s self-serving statement against a co-defendant but could not deploy one defendant’s 
confession against a co-defendant.  Hirst
49
 regards Spencer’s narrower interpretation as avoiding the 
paradox that the wider interpretation would create in preventing one co-defendant’s confession 
from being evidence against another but not producing this result if the co-defendant who made it 
died or pleaded guilty or if the indictment was severed and separate trials were ordered.     
It is suggested that there is a third viable interpretation of s.128(2), which falls between Spencer’s 
wider and narrower interpretation, namely, that a confession that is excluded under s.76(2) is not 
admissible under the hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act but may still be admissible under s.76A 
whereas a confession that is not excluded under s.76(2) may, potentially, be admissible under s.76, 
under s.76A and under provisions of the 2003 Act.  It is suggested that this intermediate 
interpretation is to be preferred to Spencer’s narrower interpretation because nothing in the 
wording of s.128(2) suggests that the operation of the subsection is merely intended to render a 
confession excluded by s.76(2) inadmissible against its maker under the 2003 Act’s hearsay 
provisions whilst still permitting its admission under those provisions for other purposes.  
Interestingly, Hirst’s treatment of Spencer’s narrower interpretation seems to equate with the 
intermediate interpretation proffered above in that Hirst, whilst apparently applying Spencer’s 
approach, suggests that:  
“a confession procured by oppression, etc., will remain inadmissible, but one that is 
legitimately obtained may in exceptional cases (and if it is in the interests of justice to do so) 
be used against any co-defendant it also incriminates, by virtue of s. 114(1)(d).”
 50
 
Contrary to Hirst’s treatment of Spencer’s approach, on a strict application of Spencer’s narrower 
interpretation, a confession procured by oppression would be inadmissible against its maker but 
would exceptionally be admissible under s.114(1)(d) against a co-defendant it incriminated whether 
or not it had been obtained legitimately because s.128(2) would not regulate the admissibility of 
confessions against persons other than their makers. 
Recourse to the Law Commission’s Report does not make clear which interpretation of s.128(2) it 
would have intended the courts to adopt.  As was seen above, the Law Commission stated its 
intention to retain the principle that “A hearsay admission is…evidence only against the person who 
made it…”
51
, which might suggest that is the wider interpretation that is in line with its proposals.  It 
was also seen above, however, that the Law Commission envisaged that there would be 
circumstances in which confessions could be admissible against persons other than their makers 
under provisions of the 2003 Act, though none of the examples that the Law Commission provided 
concerned a confession made by a defendant.  If the Law Commission intended that a confession 
made by a defendant might, exceptionally, be admissible against a person other than its maker 
under its safety-valve inclusionary discretion, this would be consistent with the narrower or 
intermediate interpretations of s.128(2), but the Report does not make this clear.    
The jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal concerning the admissibility of confessions made by 
defendants against their co-defendants under the hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act has not 
patently dealt with the question whether it is the wider, the narrower or the intermediate 
interpretation of s.128(2) that the courts should adopt.  Indeed, none of the decisions concerning 
the admissibility of confessions against persons other than their makers have even referred to 
128(2).  Consequently, whilst the following decisions demonstrate the approach that the courts have 
adopted to date concerning the admissibility of confessions made by defendants under provisions of 
the 2003 Act, they must  be viewed with caution to the extent that they are inconsistent with the 
potential operation of s.128(2).   
In R v McLean
52
 the Court of Appeal held that a hearsay statement made by one co-defendant was 
potentially admissible for another co-defendant under s.114(1)(d) of the 2003 Act and if admitted 
would be “evidence in the case generally”.
53
  Whilst Mclean has been referred to as providing 
implicit support for the proposition that a confession made by one defendant may be admissible 
against another under s.114(1)(d)
54
, the statement that the case concerned did not amount to a 
confession and consequently s.128(2) (to which the Court of Appeal did not refer) was inapplicable. 
Consequently, the McLean case provides no authority in relation to the issue of whether the courts 
should adopt the wider, the narrower or the intermediate interpretation of s.128(2).  Moreover, the 
Court of Appeal in R v Y
55
 indicated that McLean is not “authority for the proposition that the 
inhibition upon the Police interviews of one defendant being relied upon against another has simply 
been “abrogated””.  Rather, as was seen above, their Lordships in R v Y
56
 made clear that the 
admission of such evidence will not normally be in the interests of justice.  Consequently, even if the 
courts adopt either the narrower or the intermediate interpretation of s.128(2), the admissibility of 
confessions made by defendants against persons other than their makers under s.114(1)(d) of the 
2003 Act will be the exception rather than the rule.  
In R v Ibrahim & Omar
57
 a confession admitted by one co-defendant was admitted in evidence for 
another co-defendant under s.76A of the 1984 Act in circumstances in which the co-defendant who 
had made the confession did not seek to challenge its admissibility.  The Court of Appeal accepted 
that had the confession been admitted under s.114(1)(d) of the 2003 Act it would have been 
admissible against its maker’s co-defendants.  Their Lordships, with reference to R v Y,  made clear, 
however, that s.114(1)(d) was not a routine pathway to admissibility and adopted the observations 
made by the Court of Appeal in R v Y that “the greatest care” must be taken before admitting 
hearsay evidence under s.114(1)(d).
58
  As regards the relationship between s.76 of the 1984 Act and 
s.114(1)(d), their Lordships indicated that: “In theory [the confession] was admissible under both 
sections, but subject to the respective protections provided by each.”
59
  This suggests that the Court 
of Appeal in Ibrahim envisaged that evidence of a defendant’s confession could be admissible both 
against its maker and against its maker’s co-defendants under s.114(1)(d) even if the circumstances 
were such that it would not be admissible for the prosecution under s.76 in consequence of 
exclusion under s.76(2).  If the courts regard confessions made by defendants as potentially 
admissible against their makers in such circumstances this will render s.128(2) otiose.  In reaching its 
decision, however, the Court of Appeal in Ibrahim did not refer to s.128(2) and R v Y, the authority 
on which the Court of Appeal did rely, concerned a confession made by a third party, to which 
s.128(2) was inapplicable.  Consequently, since the Court of Appeal did not consider s.128(2), 
Ibrahim provides no guidance when determining whether the courts are required to adopt the 
wider, the narrower or the intermediate interpretation of s.128(2).  Moreover, since the 
admissibility of the confession was not challenged by its maker, the facts of Ibrahim do not provide 
an example of circumstances in which a confession which was inadmissible under s.76 of the 1984 
Act might potentially have been admissible under the provisions of the 2003 Act.  
So far as the operation of s.76A of the 1984 Act (which the 2003 Act inserted into the 1984 Act) is 
concerned, it was suggested above both that the Law Commission did not intend s.76A either to 
render a confession made by a defendant which was adduced by a co-defendant admissible against 
its maker and that it may not have intended s.76A to render such a confession admissible against 
persons other than its maker.
60
  Whilst reference to the wording of s.76A does clearly resolve either 
of these issues
61
, the Court of Appeal in Ibrahim appears to have accepted (arguably in line with the 
Law Commission’s intention) that the admission of the accused’s confession under s.76A did not  
make it evidence against its maker’s co-defendants, hence the need for recourse to s.114(1)(d) if the 
confession was to be admissible against them.  So far as the question whether s.76A renders a 
confession admissible against its maker, Ibrahim, being a case in which the accused did not oppose 
the introduction of his confession under s.76(2), does not seem to provide any assistance on this 
point.  In the subsequent case of R v L
62
, however, a case which did not concern the admissibility of 
confessions under provisions of the 2003 Act, the Court of Appeal seems to have accepted (contrary, 
it seems, to the Law Commission’s intention) that if a confession which had been excluded under 
s.78 of the 1984 Act and which might also potentially have been excluded under s.76(2) had been 
admitted under s.76A the jury could properly have considered the confession as evidence against its 
maker.  Moreover, in the previous case of R v Johnson
63
, which concerned the admissibility of a 
vacated guilty plea and basis of plea, the Court of Appeal seems to have accepted that where a 
confession which the judge would have excluded under s.78 was admitted under s.76A the 
confession was evidence against its maker.    
In Thakrar v R
64
, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit multiple hearsay 
evidence for the prosecution.  The evidence took the form of statements made by witnesses of 
confessions made to them by one of several co-defendants whilst, during a holiday in Cyprus, he was 
boasting about his role in committing a murder.  The confessions also incriminated a second co-
defendant, namely, their maker’s brother.  The witnesses whose hearsay evidence was relied upon 
to prove the confessions had made their statements overseas, were unwilling to come to the UK and 
were unwilling to testify.  The trial judge held that the hearsay exception created by s.116 of the 
2003 Act applied because, in accordance with s.116(2)(c), the witnesses were outside the UK and it 
wasn’t reasonably practicable to secure their attendance.  The judge held that the additional 
requirement for the admissibility of multiple hearsay imposed by s.121 of the 2003 Act was satisfied 
because, in accordance with s.121(1)(c), the value of the evidence (taking the apparent reliability of 
the statements into account) appeared to be so high that the interests of justice required the later 
statements to be admissible to prove that the earlier statements were made.  The Court of Appeal 
upheld the judge’s decision to admit the multiple hearsay and, in addition, held both that there had 
been no justification to exclude those parts of the defendant’s confessions that incriminated the 
second co-defendant and that no special direction had been required in relation to the relevant 
parts.   
In his comment upon Thakrar
65
, Ormerod recognised that the Court of Appeal had not considered: 
…whether there is a problem because of s.128(2) of the 2003 Act…D1's statement would be 
admissible against him under s.76, but would it be admissible against D2? 
Had their Lordships adopted Spencer’s wider interpretation of s.128(2), the confessions should not 
have been admissible against their maker’s brother whereas adopting the narrower interpretation 
(or, since the confession had not been excluded under s.128(2)) the intermediate interpretation 
there was scope to admit them against their maker’s brother under the 2003 Act’s hearsay regime.  
As Hirst recognised
66
, however, not only did their Lordships make no reference to s.128 of the 2003 
Act they also made no reference to s.76 of the 1984 Act itself.  Consequently, like Ibrahim, Thakrar 
provides no assistance when determining whether the courts are required to adopt the wider, the 
narrower or the intermediate interpretation of s.128(2).  Moreover, since the confession was not 
excluded under s.76(2), the facts of Ibrahim do not provide an example of circumstances in which a 
confession which was inadmissible under s.76 of the 1984 Act was admitted under the provisions of 
the 2003 Act.  
Apart from the failure to consider s.128(2) (which, upon the facts of Thakrar, is only a problem if 
Spencer’s wider interpretation is adopted), another problem encountered when considering the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Thakrar is that, as the side note to s.121 of the 2003 Act makes 
clear, s.121 does not itself amount to a hearsay exception but, rather, imposes an “additional 
requirement” that must be satisfied if multiple hearsay is to be admitted.  Consequently, in order for 
the confessions that Thakrar concerned to be admissible, it was necessary, in addition to satisfying 
the requirements of s.121 itself, both to identify a hearsay exception which was applicable to the 
accused’s confessions and to identify a hearsay exception which was applicable to the statements 
made by the absent witnesses which were relied upon to prove the confessions.
67
  The hearsay 
exception considered by the Court of Appeal in Thakrar, namely s.116 of the 2003 Act, applied to the 
statements made by the absent witnesses but the Court of Appeal did not refer to a hearsay 
exception in relation to the confession itself.  Had their Lordships considered the matter, the obvious 
hearsay exception to have applied to a confession made by the accused would have been s.76(1) of 
the 1984 Act but the problem is that, as Ormerod recognised, s.76(1) would not have made the 
confessions admissible against their maker’s brother.  The solution would have been to admit the 
confessions under s.114(1)(d).  Since the judge in Thakrar, having considered the factors specified by 
s.114(2) of the 2003 Act
68
, held that the s.121(1)(c) interests of justice of test had been satisfied (a 
test that “imposes a higher threshold” than the s.114(1)(d) interests of justice test
69
), presumably 
neither the judge nor the Court of Appeal would have had any difficulty in regarding the confession 
as admissible in the interests of justice under s.114(1)(d).  Thus, provided that the wider 
interpretation of s.128(2) is not adopted, it is possible to justify the admission of the confessions in 
Thakrar against their maker’s brother on the basis that the admission of the confessions under 
s.114(1)(d) was in the interest of justice, the statements made by the unavailable witnesses to whom 
the confessions were made were admissible under s.116 and, in compliance with s.121, the interests 




, in the context of considering the admissibility of confessions against persons other than their 
makers, regarded Thakrar as “The high-water mark of this new approach”.   It is arguable, however, 
that the case is best categorised as one of those exceptional cases in which the admission of a 
confession against a person other than its maker was justified, the Court of Appeal in Thakrar having 
regarded the reliability of those parts of the confessions that incriminated their maker’s brother as 
being as high as the reliability of those parts of the confessions that incriminated their maker 
himself.
71
  Thus, upon the facts of Thakrar, a factor that the Court of Appeal in R v Y had indicated 
was relevant when the court is determining whether a confession is admissible against a person 
other than its maker under s.114(1)(d), namely, that the maker of the confession may well have a 
motive to make a false allegation against another, did not operate against the admission of the 
confessions against their maker’s brother.  It is, perhaps, unfortunate that in Thakrar, unlike Ibrahim, 
the Court of Appeal did not make clear either that evidence of a confession made by one defendant 
should not be admitted against another co-defendant as a matter of routine or that Thakrar was one 
of those exceptional cases in which the admission of a confession for this purpose was justified.  
The subsequent case of R v Thorpe & Clark
72
 concerned a statement by a defendant to a prison 
chaplain, denying that she had been involved in her father’s death but admitting that she had been 
present when the man she was with had killed her father.  The defendant who made the confession 
did not challenge its admissibility under s.76(2) or s.78 of the 1984 Act.  The Court of Appeal 
accepted that the statement had been admissible against its maker as a mixed statement
73
 but 
indicated that the prosecution had “well repented of” its initial suggestion that the statement might 
have been admissible against her co-defendant (the man whom it implicated) under s.114(1)(d). 
Indeed, the Court of Appeal could envisage “practically no circumstances in which a conversation of 
this kind, purportedly implicating a co-accused, would be admitted under section 114(1)(d)”.
74
  As in 
Ibrahim and Thakrar, however, the Court of Appeal in Thorpe did not refer to s.128(2) and, 
consequently, like the earlier two cases, Thorpe provides no assistance when determining whether 
the courts are required to adopt the wider, the narrower or the intermediate interpretation of 
s.128(2).   
Hirst
75
 regarded the approach of Hughes LJ in Thorpe as a continuation of a process that his Lordship 
had initiated in R v Y via which he had “backed…away” from the approach that he had taken in 
McLean.  It is important to note, however, that, in Thorpe, Hughes LJ did not suggest that a 
confession made by a defendant may never be admissible under s.114(1)(d).  Rather, his Lordship’s 
comments in Thorpe concerning the operation of s.114(1)(d) related to “a conversation of this kind”, 
i.e. a mixed statement denying participation and implicating a co-defendant.  Consequently, it is 
possible to distinguish the confessions in Thakrar from that in Thorpe on the basis that the Court of 
Appeal in Thakrar considered the reliability of the confessions that Thakrar concerned as evidence 
against the co-defendant whom they also implicated as being as high as it was against their maker 
whereas the reliability of the mixed statement in Thorpe against the co-defendant whom it 
implicated was, presumably, of a much lower order.  The importance of Thorpe is that, unlike 
Thakrar, it makes clear that those circumstances in which a confession made by a defendant should 
be admitted against co-defendants under s.114(1)(d) must be regarded as wholly exceptional.  
If the Court of Appeal, if and when it is eventually referred to s.128(2) of the 2003 Act, adopts 
Spencer’s wider interpretation of that provision, there will be no potential for admitting a confession 
made by a defendant against co-defendants under provisions of the 2003 Act.  If, however, the Court 
of Appeal adopts the intermediate interpretation of that provision suggested above or Spencer’s 
narrower interpretation, the position would appear to be as follows.   
First, where a confession made by a defendant is excluded under s.76(2) and s.76A of the 1984 Act, 
adopting the intermediate interpretation of s.128(2) the confession will not be not admissible under 
any provisions of the 2003 Act.  This may result in the problem, identified by Hartstone, that 
preventing a co-defendant from adducing evidence of a confession made by a defendant may have 
“the potential to prevent him from adducing evidence that is both relevant and reliable”.
76
  
Spencer’s narrower interpretation of s.128(2) would appear to avoid this problem, by rendering the 
confession inadmissible against its maker whilst permitting the court to admit it in the interests of 
justice under s.114(1)(d) on the application of a co-defendant whom it exculpated.  Arguably, 
however, this would negate s.76A in permitting a co-defendant to adduce evidence of a defendant’s 
confession in circumstances in which s.76A(2) required its exclusion.  Spencer’s narrower 
interpretation would also produce the result that a confession that the court may not have regarded 
as sufficiently reliable to admit in evidence even against its maker could potentially be admitted for 
the prosecution against co-defendants whom it implicated.   
Secondly, where a confession made by a defendant is excluded under s.76(2) of the 1984 Act but is 
admitted for a co-defendant under s.76A, R v L seems to support the view that (arguably contrary to 
the Law Commission’s intention), the confession is admissible against its maker under s.76A but, 
adopting the intermediate interpretation, s.128(2) would prevent its admission under provisions of 
the 2003 Act.  Consequently, relying on Ibrahim in support of the proposition that s.76A does not 
render a confession made by the accused admissible against co-defendants, the confession would 
not be admissible against its maker’s co-defendants.  If Spencer’s narrower interpretation of s.128(2) 
is adopted, whilst the confession would be inadmissible against its maker the court could potentially 
admit it for the prosecution under s.114(1)(d) if, exceptionally, this was in the interests of justice.   
Thirdly, where a confession made by a defendant is excluded under s.78 of the 1984 Act it could still 
be admissible for a co-defendant under s.76A(1), in which case R v Johnson and R v L both suggest 
(again arguably contrary to the Law Commission’s intention), that it could be relied on as evidence 
against its maker.  Moreover, since the confession was not excluded under s.76(2) it would not 
matter whether the court adopted the intermediate interpretation of s.128(2) or Spencer’s narrower 
interpretation as s.128(2) would not be operative and the confession would potentially be 
admissible against its maker’s co-defendants under s.114(1)(d). As R v Y,  R v Ibrahim and R v Thorpe 
all make clear, however, the court should only admit a confession against its makers co-defendants 
under s.114(1)(d) in exceptional circumstances.   
Finally, where the admissibility of a confession is not challenged by the defendant who made it, it 
may be admitted for the prosecution under s.76(1) of the 1984 Act, for a co-defendant under 
s.76A(1) and may potentially be admissible against its maker’s co-defendants under  s.114(1)(d) but, 
again, its admission against its makers co-defendants under 114(1)(d) would appear to be 
exceptional rather than a matter of routine.  Again, in such circumstances it would not matter 
whether the court adopted the intermediate interpretation of s.128(2) or Spencer’s narrower 
interpretation as s.128(2) would not be operative. 
 
The admissibility of non-hearsay confessions  
Traditionally confessions have been regarded as a form of hearsay evidence admissible under an 
exception to the hearsay rule.  As Lord Steyn put it in R v Hayter 
77
: 
A voluntary out of court confession or admission against interest made by a defendant is an 
exception to the hearsay rule and is admissible against him. That was so under the common 
law. That is also the effect of s 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). 
As was seen above, the Law Commission intended that (“subject to the existing statutory 
safeguards”) confessions would continue to fall within an “automatic admissibility” category of 
hearsay evidence.
78
  Indeed, nothing in the Law Commission’s Report suggests that it envisaged that 
its proposed reforms to the hearsay result would result in the possibility that some confessions 
would no longer amount to hearsay statements.   
It has now become clear that, unlike the previous common law regime, the statutory hearsay 
framework created by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 encompasses most but not all confessions.  This 
is a consequence of s.115(3) of the 2003 Act which provides that:  
A matter stated is one to which this Chapter applies if (and only if) the purpose, or one of 
the purposes, of the person making the statement appears to the court to have been— 
(a)  to cause another person to believe the matter, or 
(b)  to cause another person to act or a machine to operate on the basis that the 
matter is as stated.” 
The Court of Appeal has recognised that where evidence of statements which were not made in oral 
evidence in criminal proceedings and which are relied on as evidence of matters stated therein falls 
outside the ambit of the hearsay rule due to the operation of s.115(3), the admissibility of such 
evidence is not governed by the hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act but, rather, is governed by the 
common law test of relevance.
79
  Where such evidence is tendered by the prosecution, its 
admissibility is subject to the exercise of the court’s exclusionary discretion under s.78 of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
80
.   
More specifically for present purposes, the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Twist
81
 (in the 
context of the Lowe appeal) has demonstrated that where the maker of a confession did not make it 
for the purpose of causing another person to believe the matter stated, the confession will not fall 
within the ambit of the 2003 Act’s hearsay provisions and its admissibility will not be subject to the 
operation of those provisions even though it is relied upon as evidence of the matters stated.  The 
fact that some confessions might fall outside the ambit of the 2003 Act’s hearsay rule had been 
anticipated by Birch and Hirst
82
 prior to Twist, such confessions subsequently being described by 
Hirst
83
 as “non-hearsay confessions”.  For present purposes, the crucial question is whether the 
existence of the hearsay/non hearsay confessions dichotomy has resulted in distinct rules governing 
the respective admissibility of hearsay and non-hearsay confessions.   
Before the Court of Appeal in Twist it was submitted that the non-hearsay confession that the Lowe 
appeal concerned should have been excluded under s.76 of the 1984 Act.  Their Lordships held that: 
“…there was no basis for so doing. It was not the defendant's case that he had said what he did in 
consequence of something said or done by another that would render his confession unreliable.”
84
 
Thus, the Court of Appeal in Twist did not suggest that the admissibility for the prosecution of a non-
hearsay confession made by the accused is not governed by s.76 of the 1984 Act.   
Prior to Twist, Birch and Hirst
85
 had already suggested that confessions in secret diaries (which 
would not amount to hearsay evidence due to the operation of s.115(3) of the 2003 Act) would fall 
within the ambit of the definition of a confession in s.82(1) of the 1984 Act
86
 and, thus, that the 
admissibility of such confessions would depend upon the operation of s.76(2).
87
  The validity of their 
submission depended both upon accepting that such a confession is a “statement” for the purposes 
of s.82(1)) of the 1984 Act and upon accepting that the law relating to confessions does not merely 
regulate the operation of an exception to the hearsay rule.  Subsequent to Twist, Hirst’s analysis of 
Twist
88
 was that the non-hearsay confessions in Lowe were admissible under s.76(1) and that had 
they not been admissible under s.76(1) due to the operation of s.76(2) then, regardless of whether 
they were hearsay, they would have been inadmissible under the hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act 
due to the operation of s.128(2).  Whilst Hirst does not make this clear in his article, presumably the 
basis of his argument is that since s.128(2) provides that “nothing in this Chapter makes a confession 
by a defendant admissible if it would not be admissible under section 76 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984”, s.128(2) both prevents a hearsay confession which is excluded by s.76(2) of the 
1984 Act from being admissible under a hearsay exception other than s.76A and also prevents 
s.115(3) of the 2003 Act from operating so as to render such a confession admissible at common law 
by taking it outside the ambit of the 2003 Act’s statutory hearsay regime.  Section 114(3), which was 
reproduced above, would also appear to confirm that the provisions of the 2003 Act (other than 
s.128(1), which inserted s.76A into the 1984 Act) are not intended to render admissible a confession 
excluded by virtue of the operation of s.76(2) of the 1984 Act.  This approach would seem to be in 
line with the Law Commission’s intention that the admissibility of confessions would continue to be 
governed by s.76 and s.78 of the 1984 Act and the exercise of the common law exclusionary 
discretion preserved by s.82(3) of the 1984 Act, augmented by s.76A when a confession is tendered 
by a co-defendant.  Indeed, as was seen above, the example provided by the explanatory notes to 
the 2003 Act regarding the operation of s.114(3) indicates that the admissibility of confessions 
continues to be governed by ss.76 and 78 of the 1984 Act.     
Whilst the Court of Appeal in Twist implicitly appears to have accepted that the admissibility of a 
non hearsay confession made by a defendant is subject to the operation of s.76 of the 1984 Act, a 
question that the Court of Appeal in Twist was not required to consider is whether a non-hearsay 
confession made by a defendant may be admissible against its maker’s co-defendants.  The problem 
is that whilst the hearsay exceptions created by the 2003 Act are capable of prevailing over the 
common law rule that confessions are only admissible against their makers
89
, in the case of a non-
hearsay confession which falls outside the ambit of the 2003 Act’s hearsay provisions, there is no 
applicable hearsay exception to prevail over the common law rule.  This is so because the hearsay 
exceptions created by the 2003 Act render evidence admissible as evidence of “any matter stated”
90
 
and the effect of s.115(3) is that the matters stated in a non-hearsay confession are not matters 
stated to which the hearsay provisions of the 2003 Act are applicable.  
 It is suggested that the answer to this problem is that the provision that prevails over the common 
law rule in the context of the non-hearsay confession is s.115(3) itself.  This is so because whilst 
there is no reason to believe that the Law Commission intended its proposals to result in the 
creation of the non-hearsay confession, such confessions falls within a wider class of evidence that 
the Law Commission intended to render admissible.  As the Law Commission indicated when 
explaining the basis of the provision that now exists in the form of s.115(3): “If…the risk of deliberate 
fabrication can be discounted, the possibility of a mistake is not necessarily sufficient reason to 
exclude evidence of…words or conduct”.
91
  Thus, the Law Commission’s view, expressed in the 
context of “implied assertions”
92
, was that: 
…where the person from whose conduct a fact is to be inferred can safely be assumed to 
have believed that fact to be true – we do not think a court should be precluded from 
inferring that fact merely because that person may have been mistaken in believing it.
93
  
Applying this reasoning to non-hearsay confessions, the justification for removing them from the 
ambit of the hearsay rule would be that since the person who made the confession did not make it 
for the purpose of making anyone else believe the matter stated the risk that it was fabricated can 
be discounted.  Indeed, the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeal in R v Y
94
 between confessions 
relied on as evidence against their makers and confessions relied on as evidence against others as 
regards the potential existence of a motive to fabricate where a confession implicates a person 
other than its maker is not applicable in circumstances in which the person who made the 
confession did not make it with the purpose of making another person believe the matter stated.  
Upon the assumption that s.115(3) does prevail over the common law rule that confessions are only 
admissible against their makers in the context of non-hearsay confessions, the result so far as non-
hearsay confessions made by defendants are concerned seems to be that provided that such a 
confession is not excluded by virtue of the operation of s.76(2) of the 1984 Act and assuming that 
the courts adopts the intermediate interpretation of s.128(2) which was suggested above, the 
confession, subject to the common law test of relevance (and to the exercise of exclusionary 
discretion if they were tendered by the prosecution) will be admissible not only against its maker but 
also against other co-defendants implicated thereby.  If Spencer’s narrower interpretation of 
s.128(2) is adopted, the confession could be admitted against co-defendants even if the operation of 
s.76(2) prevented its admission for the prosecution.  In contrast, if Spencer’s wider interpretation is 
adopted it would seem that even if the confession was admissible against its maker under s.76(1) it 
could still not be admissible against its maker’s co-defendants as it would not be admissible against 
them under s.76(1) or s.76A(1).    
A final question to which the authorities currently do not provide an answer is whether a non-
hearsay confession made by a third party is admissible in criminal proceedings.  As was seen above, 
none of ss.76 and s.76A of the 1984 Act and s.128(2) of the 2003 Act apply to a confession made by 
a third party.  It was also seen above in relation to the admissibility of confessions made by third 
parties that s.114(1)(d) of the 2003 Act “…prevails over the…common law rule that hearsay 
contained in a confession is inadmissible except against its maker.”
95
  Since non-hearsay confessions 
fall outside the ambit of the statutory hearsay framework created by the 2003 Act, a non-hearsay 
confession made by a third party, like one made by a defendant, cannot be admissible under 
s.114(1)(d) or any other of the hearsay exceptions created by the 2003 Act.  If, however, it is correct 
that, as was suggested above, s.115(3) of the 2003 Act prevails over the common law rule that 
confessions are only admissible against their makers in the context of non-hearsay confessions then 
the admissibility of non-hearsay confessions made by third parties will be governed by the common 






The Law Commission’s Report leaves several issues relating to the admissibility of confessions under 
its proposed statutory hearsay regime unclear.  Whilst the Law Commission clearly intended to 
preserve the admissibility regime created by s.76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 1984 and to 
enhance this via the addition of s.76A and the Report suggests it did not intend s.76A to render a 
confession made by a defendant admissible against its maker when tendered by a co-defendant, 
whether its intention was that such a confession could be admissible against persons other than its 
maker is less clear.  Moreover, the Report neither provides any explanation of how the provision 
that now exists as s.128(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 nor recognises that the provision that 
now exists as s.115(3) Act has the potential to create non-hearsay confessions.  The Report does, 
however, make clear that the Law Commission did intend that there would be circumstances in 
which confessions made by third parties to criminal proceedings would be admissible under its 
proposed hearsay regime.   
The jurisprudence subsequent to the coming into force of the 2003 Act’s hearsay provisions has 
established that confessions made by third parties may, exceptionally, be admissible in the interests 
of justice under s.114(1)(d) of the 2003 Act and also may have established that where a confession 
made by defendant is admitted under s.76A it may be relied upon as evidence against its maker.  
Moreover, there is authority for the proposition that a confession made by a defendant may be 
admissible in the interests of justice against its maker’s co-defendants under s.114(1)(d) though, 
again, the admission of such evidence appears to be exception rather than a matter of routine.  The 
case law has both established the existence of the non-hearsay confession and has indicated that 
the admissibility of a non-hearsay confession made by a defendant is subject to the operation of s.76 
of the 1984 Act, though as of yet there is no authority concerning either the admissibility of non-
hearsay confessions made by third parties to criminal proceedings or the admissibility of non-
hearsay confessions made by defendants against persons other than their maker.   
The most significant defect of the existing case law is the absence of any analysis of s.128(2) of the 
2003 Act.  Whether its operation totally precludes the admission of confessions made by defendants 
under any provisions of the 2003 Act, precludes the admission of such confessions under provisions 
of the 2003 Act in circumstances in which they are not admissible under s.76 of the 1984 Act or 
merely prevents the admission of such confessions as evidence against the accused in such 
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